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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

2 June 1960

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

In a speech in Moscow on 28 May, Khrushchev carried forward the effort initiated in his East Berlin address to minimize any adverse consequences of the summit failure on Soviet foreign policy. In elaborating on his explanation of the U-2 incident and the Paris talks, Khrushchev again sought to explain and justify the contradiction between his policy of détente and his performance in Paris. He asserted that "we have operated, still operate, and will operate" in the direction of relaxing international tensions, despite the collapse of the summit conference. He concluded that Soviet policy was "correct and just" and asked, "Why should it be changed?"

Although he ridiculed President Eisenhower and again attacked the United States on the U-2 incident, Khrushchev apparently is beginning to work back toward his pre-summit position which drew a distinction between the President and "cold-war forces" in the US. Conjuring up a contrast between the President's "good intentions" and US foreign policy, Khrushchev said, "I still believe President Eisenhower himself wants peace." In this manner the Soviet premier is apparently seeking to protect himself from any charges that he was mistaken in his judgment and had allowed himself to be deceived by the President.

Khrushchev took the unusual step of specifically denying speculation that internal opposition or pressure from Communist China was responsible for his

behavior in Paris, as well as Western conjectures that Mikoyan may be in trouble. His references to Mikoyan, however, were sufficiently vague to leave Mikoyan's status in doubt. A future demotion remains a possibility, although any move against him may be put off for some time, as was the case with Bulganin.

Although in his speech Khrushchev again expressed hope that a new summit meeting would take place in "six to eight months," he added that he would not be surprised if this did not occur. His call for the inclusion of Communist China, India, Indonesia, and other countries in future meetings could be designed to open a way out of the commitment he made in his 20 May speech in Berlin to maintain the status quo there until a new summit. He again counseled patience until a new meeting and reaffirmed his intention to strive in the meantime for negotiated settlements of outstanding problems, including the German and Berlin questions.

During private talks in East Berlin on 19 and 20 May, East German party chief Ulbricht reportedly urged Khrushchev to take prompt action on a separate peace treaty with East Germany, on the ground that a summit conference in six to eight months was highly unlikely. Ulbricht reasoned that Western agreement to a new summit would probably be conditional on positive assurances against a repetition of the events in Paris, and

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Khrushchev agreed with this evaluation. The Soviet premier refused, however, to commit the USSR to a specific timetable on a separate peace treaty, and agreed only to Ulbricht's suggestion that the Berlin and German treaty questions be raised through diplomatic channels.

In a public lecture on international affairs in Moscow, the speaker emphasized that the current increase in international tension was of a temporary nature and assured his audience that the "basic forces" leading to a relaxation of tension were still operative. The lecturer claimed that, in contrast to the "consistent failures" prior to Stalin's death, subsequent Soviet efforts to reduce tension had been successful; as the summit approached, however, it became clear that no progress could be expected on Berlin, and the US announcement on 7 May of plans to conduct nuclear tests to improve detection techniques "scuttled" the sole issue with good prospects for agreement.

According to an American Embassy officer attending the lecture, the audience appeared concerned over the possible effects on US-Soviet relations of a trial of Francis Powers and the conclusion of a separate East German peace treaty.

The Soviet press treatment of foreign reactions to Khrushchev's speech stresses expressions of hope that a policy of detente will continue and that there is still a prospect for East-West negotiations. Pravda on 30 May quotes The New York Times that "Khrushchev is obviously holding to his course"

on more consumer goods and on his effort "to maintain peace by means of diplomatic negotiations with the West." TASS dispatches from Paris, London, and Bonn report that Khrushchev's speech is being interpreted as an indication that Moscow will continue its detente policy.

Marshal Malinovsky's 30 May warning that he had instructed Soviet missile forces to retaliate against the base of any aircraft intruding on the air space of the USSR or its allies was designed to maintain the momentum of the Soviet campaign against American bases abroad. He was careful to restrict his order for retaliation to bases, and he refrained from using Khrushchev's broader threat to strike against both the base and the country which controlled the base. Thus far, Soviet propaganda has stressed Malinovsky's statement that his order to Soviet forces was intended as a "warning and not a threat."

Nuclear Test Talks

In the first meeting of the nuclear test talks since the summit, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin made it clear that further progress on developing a research program for improving methods of detecting small underground explosions would be dependent on agreement on the duration of the moratorium on these tests. However, the Soviet experts discussing aspects of the research program allowed the talks to adjourn on 30 May without provoking a dispute over the final report.

In agreeing that each delegation should report back to its own political delegation,

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

2 June 1960

the chief Soviet expert noted that basic differences remained on the number of test explosions, the use of experimental tests to investigate the possibility of muffling the shock of underground explosions, and the use of tests in the range of one kiloton or less. He also stressed that since Moscow could not begin the work involved in a research program until it was assured that the control system would be installed, the program could not be implemented until a treaty was signed.

Soviet tactics in returning the unresolved questions to the political conference suggest that Moscow will refuse to commit itself to a program sanctioning US tests before resolution of the main political questions--duration of the moratorium and the annual quota for on-site inspections. As a means to extract concessions on these two issues, the Soviet delegation probably hopes to exploit Western desire to begin the research as soon as possible.

As an additional form of pressure, directed primarily toward the British delegation, Tsarapkin echoed Khrushchev's warning that unilateral experimental testing by the United States would be interpreted as freeing the USSR from its commitment not to resume testing. Tsarapkin elaborated on Khrushchev's statement by adding that the USSR would consider itself free to resume weapons tests of any size and in any environment.

Peiping's Reaction

Although Khrushchev's latest speech in Moscow was printed on

30 May in People's Daily, the official Chinese party organ, Peiping did not highlight the part about possible Chinese participation at the next summit and has not commented thus far on the speech. Instead, Peiping has emphasized the futility of such negotiations because "US imperialism will never change." Chinese comment on President Eisenhower's report to the nation has concentrated on the "fake" American peace gestures and the need to "expose" them and has concluded that peace can be safeguarded "only by waging a resolute struggle against the US."

Peiping's leaders apparently have no illusions about their chances of participating in a future summit conference. They undoubtedly view a future summit meeting--as the Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo recently suggested--as unlikely to yield them any practical results, particularly in regard to reducing American support for the Chinese Nationalists. The ambassador stated that Peiping cannot accept statements of American good intentions as long as the US continues its "occupation" of Taiwan.

Western Positions

French President de Gaulle's 31 May speech castigated Khrushchev for scuttling the summit. De Gaulle voiced France's willingness to continue all efforts to relax tensions in order to avoid the "monstrous peril" of nuclear war, but he also called for a return to the "methodical steps of diplomacy" as the means to this end. His formula for relaxing tensions included the two French proposals he originated and has persistently pushed--controlled disarmament aimed

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~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

2 June 1960

at vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and East-West cooperation on aid to underdeveloped nations.

De Gaulle cited the solidarity the West exhibited at the summit and stressed France's intention to remain an integral part of the Atlantic alliance. He nevertheless reiterated that France "must be sole mistress of her resources and her territory," underlining at the same time his insistence on "ever closer coordination" of Western policy and strategy. He also stressed the growing importance of an increasingly integrated Western Europe in international affairs, and forecast a "European entente from the Atlantic to the Urals."

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